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HERB, FAITH & FREEDOM

  • Writer: psyktcha
    psyktcha
  • Mar 14
  • 19 min read

How Nigeria's Own Constitution Already Legalises Cannabis

For Personal Use — If We Are Brave Enough to Read It

Opinion piece only. Not legal advice. All authorities cited are real and verifiable.



TL;DR — Nigeria is the world's third-largest cannabis consumer, yet carrying it can land you in prison for twenty-five years. The Constitution says you are free to practise your religion and that your home is your own. Nigeria's Supreme Court has already decided that what a competent adult does with their own body is their business, not the state's. Courts across four continents have said the same thing. This article explains why the law needs to catch up — and why, constitutionally, it already has.

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I.  The Irony Nigeria Cannot Keep Ignoring

TL;DR — We are one of the biggest cannabis-consuming nations on earth. The law says possession earns you up to twenty-five years. The Constitution says you have religious freedom and a right to privacy. Something has to give.


Let us start with a fact that nobody in authority wants to say out loud: Nigeria is the third-largest consumer of cannabis on the planet. Not a fringe hobby. Not a foreign import. Our farms in Ondo, Ogun, and Edo States supply a continent. Our forests grow it. Our streets know it. And our prisons are full of people whose only crime was to possess it.

Under the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act (Cap. N30, LFN 2004), simple possession of cannabis carries a minimum sentence of fifteen years and a maximum of twenty-five. The Indian Hemp Act 1966 once carried the death penalty. Life imprisonment is still on the books. These are not figures from a dystopian novel. They are the law of the Federal Republic — applied today, in courtrooms that otherwise claim to be governed by a constitution that guarantees freedom.

That Constitution — the CFRN 1999 — is the same document that contains Section 38, which guarantees every person the freedom to practise and observe their religion. It is the same document that contains Section 37, which protects the privacy of citizens in their homes. And it is the same document that says, in Section 1(3), that any law inconsistent with it is void to the extent of that inconsistency.

Void. Not inconvenient. Not awkward. Void. That is the word the Constitution uses. The question before us is not whether that word is there. It plainly is. The question is whether anyone in Nigeria is prepared to apply it.


PRINCIPLE: Constitutional Supremacy

Section 1(1) and 1(3) CFRN 1999 — The Constitution is supreme. Any law inconsistent with it is void to the extent of that inconsistency. This is not a creative argument. It is the foundation of every constitutional democracy, and it is written into the first page of Nigeria's own.

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II.  Rastafari Is a Religion. Cannabis Is Its Eucharist.

TL;DR — Rastafari is a serious, globally recognised Abrahamic religion, not a cover story for drug use. Cannabis is its central sacrament — as essential to Rastafari worship as wine is to Catholic Mass. You cannot criminalise a sacrament and then claim to respect religious freedom.


Before we get to the constitutional argument, we need to deal with the condescension that always enters this conversation. Rastafari is not a costume. It is not a lifestyle brand. It is not, as some critics lazily suggest, a convenient theological wrapper around recreational drug use.

Rastafari is a monotheistic Abrahamic religion, born in Jamaica in the 1930s from the convergence of Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity, Pan-Africanist thought, and Ethiopianism. It reveres Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, as the returned Messiah of the Book of Revelation. It has millions of practitioners across Africa, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Americas. It has its own theology, its own liturgy, its own ethics, and its own scripture. Courts across four continents have examined it and reached the same conclusion: it is a religion, full stop.

At the centre of that religion is cannabis — the Holy Herb, what practitioners call the Healing of the Nations. It is consumed through a chalice as Holy Communion. It is burned as incense during worship. It features in meditation, prayer, and ritual bathing. And its use is not incidental — it is grounded in scripture:


SCRIPTURE

Genesis 1:29 — I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth.

Psalm 104:14 — He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle and herb for the service of man.

Revelation 22:2 — The leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.


You may disagree with that theology. You may find it unconvincing. But disagreement with a religion is not the legal test. The legal test is sincerity. And Rastafari's use of cannabis is as sincere, as ancient, and as central to its practice as the cup of wine in a Catholic Mass, the kiddush on a Jewish Sabbath table, or the peyote ceremony of the Native American Church. Criminalise the herb and you have not regulated a drug — you have outlawed a sacrament.

South Africa's Constitutional Court looked at this squarely and did not flinch:

Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope [2002] ZACC 1 (Prince II) — South Africa

Rastafarianism is a religion. Cannabis use is central to it. Prohibiting cannabis possession is a limitation of the constitutional right to freedom of religion. The court ultimately found the limitation justified under South Africa's Section 36 proportionality framework — but Nigeria has no Section 36. Nigeria's Section 45 operates differently, and as we argue below, the state's case under it is far weaker.

Italy's Supreme Court of Cassation was more direct. In July 2008, a Rastafarian from Perugia was convicted of possessing 97 grams of cannabis. The Supreme Court acquitted him. The message was simple: where the religious character of possession is genuinely established, the criminal law yields. No new legislation was needed. No parliamentary debate was required. The court read its constitution, looked at the facts, and did the obvious thing.

Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), July 2008 — Unnamed Defendant, Perugia

A Rastafarian's possession of cannabis for sacramental use is constitutionally protected religious practice. Criminal conviction quashed. Where sincere religious practice is established, the state must either stand aside or produce compelling evidence that the specific conduct causes specific harm.

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III.  Section 38 CFRN: The Provision the NDLEA Hopes You Never Read

TL;DR — Section 38 does not just protect what you believe in your head. It protects what you actually do as part of your religion — your practice and observance. Nigerian courts have already enforced this on behalf of Muslim students. The same protection belongs to Rastafari practitioners.


SECTION 38(1) CFRN 1999

Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, PRACTICE and OBSERVANCE.


Two words in that provision carry enormous weight, and they are words the state would rather you skipped over: practice and observance. Not just belief. Not just private thought. The Constitution protects the physical, external expression of your faith — the things you actually do in the name of your religion.

A Rastafarian who lights a chalice in their home is not committing a crime. They are practising their religion, in the precise sense that Section 38(1) uses the word. That practice is constitutionally protected. A law that makes it a criminal offence carrying fifteen years in prison is a law that — applied in that context — is inconsistent with the Constitution. And under Section 1(3), you know what happens to laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution.

Our Own Courts Have Already Said So

There is no Nigerian case directly on cannabis and religion. But the law that would govern such a case has already been made — in two decisions that every lawyer in this country should know:

Provost, Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin v Basirat Saliu & Ors — Court of Appeal Nigeria

A Muslim student was denied entry unless she removed her Niqab and Hijab. The Court of Appeal held that this violated Section 38 CFRN. The court was unambiguous: any restriction on the external practice of religion must satisfy the strict conditions in Section 45 of the Constitution. Discomfort, inconvenience, or community disapproval are not sufficient justifications. Section 38 protects what you wear, what you say, and what you do in the name of your faith.

Nkpa v Nkume — Court of Appeal Nigeria

Members of the Jehovah's Witness faith refused to pay community development levies and declined to participate in communal exercises on religious grounds. The lower court found their religious tenet made them 'odious before the people' and ruled against them. The Court of Appeal overturned that finding completely. Section 38 protects your religious practice even when your community finds it irritating, antisocial, or inconvenient.

Let those two decisions sink in. Nigerian courts have protected a woman's right to cover her face. They have protected a community's refusal to pay levies. These are external acts — things done in the physical world in the name of a faith. The sacramental consumption of cannabis by a Rastafarian in their own home is the same category of act. If the courts were consistent — and consistency is the foundation of the rule of law — they would protect it too.


PRINCIPLE: The External Manifestation Principle

Section 38 protects the outward practice and observance of religion, not merely inward belief. A law that criminalises a religion's central liturgical act does not merely restrict that religion — it destroys it. Confirmed in Kwara College v Saliu and Nkpa v Nkume, both decided by the Nigerian Court of Appeal.

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IV.  Section 45: The State's Best Argument — And Why It Falls Short

TL;DR — Yes, the state can restrict your rights under Section 45 for public health or order. But the restriction must be 'reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.' Twenty-five years for private use is not reasonable. The state cannot name a single third party harmed by one person smoking in their own home.


The State Will Say This

Section 45(1)(a) CFRN allows the government to restrict the rights in Sections 37 and 38 by laws that are reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of public safety, public order, public morality, or public health. The NDLEA Act will be defended on those grounds. That is a real legal argument, and it deserves a real legal answer — not dismissal.

Here Is the Real Answer

Section 45 is not a magic wand. The word 'reasonably' is doing serious constitutional work in that provision, and it has to mean something. A sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years for a person who possessed cannabis for their own private use, in their own home, injuring nobody — that is not a reasonable restriction. It is a sledgehammer deployed against a matchstick.

The NDLEA Act was built to go after drug barons, trafficking networks, and criminal supply chains. There is nothing wrong with that objective. But when you take the same Act and point it at a Rastafarian burning a chalice in their own compound, or a young person in their flat who has hurt absolutely no one, the law has gone beyond its reasonable purpose and into the territory of constitutional excess.

Brazil's Supreme Court said exactly this, and in terms that apply equally in Nigeria:

RE 635.659 — Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Brazil, 26 June 2024

Criminalising cannabis possession for personal use violates constitutional rights. The court set a threshold of 40 grams or six plants to formally distinguish personal use from trafficking. But perhaps most powerfully, it found that blanket enforcement without that distinction had produced documented racial and class bias: Black and poor Brazilians were charged as traffickers with the same quantities for which white, educated Brazilians were treated as mere users. That unequal operation is itself a constitutional violation. A law that functions this way in practice cannot be described as reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.

That finding will be uncomfortable to read in the Nigerian context, because the same pattern exists here. NDLEA enforcement does not fall on Nigerians equally. It falls on those who cannot afford to make it go away. It falls on the street-level user, not on those with resources and connections. That is not public health enforcement. That is selective punishment. And selective punishment of the powerless is not something a constitution exists to protect.


PRINCIPLE: Proportionality and Reasonable Justification

A limitation of fundamental rights under Section 45 must be proportionate to the public interest it serves. A fifteen-to-twenty-five-year sentence for private personal consumption that harms no third party fails that test. Courts in South Africa (Prince III, 2018), Brazil (RE 635.659, 2024), and Argentina (Arriola, 2009) have all held that the personal use and trafficking distinction is not a policy preference — it is a constitutional requirement.

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V.  Your Body, Your Home, Your Constitution

TL;DR — This argument belongs to every Nigerian adult, not just Rastafari practitioners. Section 37 CFRN protects your privacy. Nigeria's own Supreme Court already decided that what a competent adult does with their body in private is not the state's business. That case had nothing to do with cannabis. The principle is the same.


SECTION 37 CFRN 1999

The privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications is hereby guaranteed and protected.


There is a version of this debate that rests entirely on religion. But the more powerful argument is simpler and belongs to everyone: what happens in your own home, affecting nobody but yourself, is constitutionally protected private conduct. The state has no legitimate business there. Not because cannabis is harmless — reasonable people disagree about that — but because in a constitutional democracy, adults are not children, and the criminal law is not a babysitter.

Nigeria's Supreme Court has already said this. Not about cannabis — about something far starker.

Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Dr. John Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 — Supreme Court of Nigeria

A Jehovah's Witness patient refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds. She died. The doctor who had respected her informed refusal was then charged with infamous professional conduct. The Supreme Court dismissed the charge. Per Ayoola JSC: 'Where the direct consequence of a decision not to submit to medical treatment is limited to the competent adult patient alone, no injustice can be occasioned in giving individual right primacy.' A competent adult's private decision about their own body — even one that results in their death — takes constitutional primacy over the state's preference.

Sit with that for a moment. Nigeria's highest court held that a person can choose to die rather than accept a substance the state regards as lifesaving — and the state must respect that choice. If the Constitution protects your right to reject a substance into your body, it protects your right to accept one. The logic is not even a stretch. It is the same sentence, read twice.

South Africa reached the privacy conclusion directly:

Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince [2018] ZACC 30 (Prince III) — Constitutional Court, South Africa

The constitutional right to privacy entitles an adult to use, possess, or cultivate cannabis in a private place for personal consumption. The state has no legitimate interest in intruding upon this private, self-regarding conduct. Criminal sanctions for personal private cannabis use are constitutionally invalid. This decision led directly to the Cannabis for Private Purposes Act, No. 7 of 2024.

And Argentina's eleven-member Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, put it most plainly of all:

Arriola, Sebastián y otros v Recurso de Hecho (A.891.XLIV) — Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Argentina, 25 August 2009 — Unanimous, 11-0

Criminalising cannabis possession for personal use is unconstitutional where it poses no danger or harm to others. Argentina's Article 19 — which protects private actions of individuals that injure no third party — is violated by punishing personal use. Nigeria's Section 37, read alongside Section 38, establishes the same constitutional firewall.


PRINCIPLE: The Self-Regarding Conduct Principle

A constitutional state cannot criminalise conduct that is private, personal, and causes no harm to any third party. This principle appears in Nigeria's own Supreme Court (Okonkwo, 2001), South Africa's Constitutional Court (Prince III, 2018), and Argentina's Supreme Court (Arriola, 2009 — unanimous, 11-0). It applies directly to private cannabis use.

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VI.  Draw the Line Where It Actually Belongs

TL;DR — Nobody serious is arguing for an open drug market. The argument is simple: put the legal line between the person in their own home and the trafficker supplying the street. Keep trafficking criminal. Stop treating the former like the latter.


Let us be absolutely clear about what this article is not arguing. It is not arguing that Nigeria should become Amsterdam. It is not arguing that cannabis should be sold freely, advertised on billboards, or distributed without any regulation. None of that is on the table.

What is on the table is this: the person sitting in their own home, using a plant that they grew or purchased for their personal use, harming nobody — that person is not a drug trafficker. The law should not treat them like one. And the Constitution, honestly applied, does not permit it.

THE LINE THAT MAKES SENSE

Decriminalise: personal use, private possession of small quantities, home cultivation of a defined small number of plants for personal use, and sacramental use by Rastafari practitioners.

Maintain — and strengthen where necessary: criminal sanctions for commercial sale, distribution, trafficking, and supply to minors.


This is not a radical position. Jamaica drew exactly that line in 2015. The Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, effective 15 April 2015, created a specific statutory exemption for possession of cannabis for religious purposes as a sacrament for the Rastafarian faith under Section 7(2)(c)(a), while maintaining full criminal penalties for supply and trafficking.

Italy's Supreme Court of Cassation drew the same line in December 2019:

Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), December 2019 — Home Cultivation Ruling

Cultivating a small number of cannabis plants at home exclusively for personal use does not constitute a criminal offence. The law targets supply and distribution — not the private cultivation decisions of individual citizens. The criminal law's reach ends at your front door when no supply or harm to others is involved.

And the US Supreme Court, though in a different statutory context, set out the framework that applies everywhere:

Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418 (2006) — United States Supreme Court

Before the government substantially burdens sincere religious practice, it must demonstrate a compelling state interest and must use the least restrictive means available to achieve it. A blanket prohibition is not automatically compelling when applied to individual sacramental use. The state cannot simply point to the existence of a drug law. It must justify that law's application to this person, in this context, with this conduct.


PRINCIPLE: Least Restrictive Means

Where the state has a legitimate interest in regulating a substance, it must achieve that interest by the means least restrictive of fundamental rights. A licensing and exemption regime for personal use and religious practice is available, workable, and has been implemented in multiple jurisdictions. Twenty-five years in prison is not the least restrictive means. It is the most destructive available, pointed at the wrong people. Source: Gonzales v O Centro Espirita (2006), United States Supreme Court.

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VII.  What Needs to Happen — And Who Needs to Do It

TL;DR — The National Assembly received reform bills in 2020 and 2023 and buried both. Rastafari practitioners and cannabis users already have constitutional tools available today. The courts are open.


The National Assembly

In 2020 and again in 2023, members of the House of Representatives introduced bills to reform Nigeria's cannabis laws. The 2023 consolidated bill — sponsored by Miriam Onuoha, Benjamin Kalu, and Olumide Osoba — sought to amend the NDLEA Act to permit licensed cultivation and personal use. It failed its second reading in March 2023. It should not have.

Every argument in this article was available to the members who voted that bill down. They chose not to engage with it. They will have another opportunity. When it comes, they should remember that the question before them is not whether cannabis is good or bad. It is whether the Constitution they swore to uphold permits them to imprison millions of Nigerians for a private choice that harms no one else.


The NDLEA

The agency's recent posture — pushing for harsher penalties, seeking to remove judicial discretion in drug sentencing — is heading in exactly the wrong direction. Escalating criminal punishment against behaviour that millions of citizens engage in daily is not law enforcement. It is theatre. When the law and the reality it governs have diverged this dramatically, the problem is with the law.

Rastafari Practitioners and the Cannabis Community


YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL TOOLS — AVAILABLE TODAY

Section 37 and Section 38 CFRN, together with the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009, are sufficient to commence a fundamental rights enforcement action in the Federal High Court. The case law in this article — from Nigeria's own Supreme Court, from South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Italy — provides the full doctrinal architecture. The road has been built. What is needed is a bona fide Rastafarian applicant prepared to walk it.


The Producing States

Ondo State Governor Rotimi Akeredolu was right in 2019 when he raised the possibility of cannabis cultivation reform. The concurrent legislative list argument — that cultivation as an agricultural matter is a state competence — is legally alive and underexplored. State governments with cannabis-producing communities should be pursuing it, not leaving it dormant.

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VIII.  The Herb Is Already Constitutional

Nobody who reads this article carefully is being asked to accept a revolutionary proposition. The argument is conservative, in the truest sense: it asks that existing constitutional provisions be applied to existing facts, consistently, without fear or favour.

Section 38 says you can practise your religion. Section 37 says your home is protected. Section 1(3) says laws inconsistent with those provisions are void. Nigeria's Supreme Court said in 2001 that a competent adult's private bodily choice is their own. South Africa said in 2018 that private cannabis use is constitutionally protected. Argentina said the same unanimously in 2009. Brazil confirmed it in 2024. Italy's Supreme Court has been saying it since 2008.

These are not radical foreign ideas being imported to destabilise Nigeria's moral order. They are the outputs of constitutional courts doing exactly what constitutional courts exist to do: holding governments to the promises written in their founding documents.

Nigeria has made those same promises. Section 38. Section 37. Section 1(3). They are not aspirational clauses. They are binding law. The NDLEA Act, applied to a Rastafarian burning incense in private, is inconsistent with them. The Indian Hemp Act, applied to an adult making a personal choice in their own home, is inconsistent with them. Both are void, to that extent, under the document that every public official in Nigeria swore to defend.


Stop filling prisons with people whose only offence was a private choice that hurt no one. Stop treating a Rastafarian's act of communion as equivalent to armed robbery. Stop pretending that a law this punitive, this selectively enforced, this far removed from the reality it claims to govern, is serving anyone but the system that profits from its abuse.


The herb is already constitutional. It is time the law caught up.

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IX.  Case Law — All Authorities

Nigerian Authorities

Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 — Supreme Court of Nigeria

A competent adult's private bodily choice takes constitutional primacy over state interference. Principle: Bodily Autonomy and Self-Regarding Conduct.


Provost, Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin v Basirat Saliu & Ors — Court of Appeal Nigeria

Section 38 protects external religious practice. Section 45 restrictions must be proportionate. Principle: External Manifestation and Proportionality.


Nkpa v Nkume — Court of Appeal Nigeria

Section 38 protects religious practice even when socially inconvenient. Principle: External Manifestation.


Registered Trustees of AMORC (Nigeria) v Awoniyi (1994) ALL NLR 479

Defines the limits of Section 38. Rastafari, being a public and internationally recognised religion, falls fully within its protection.


South African Authorities

Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope [2002] ZACC 1 (Prince II)

Rastafari is a religion. Cannabis is central to it. Prohibition limits the religious freedom right. Principle: Religious Recognition.


Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince [2018] ZACC 30 (Prince III)

Privacy protects personal cannabis use. Criminal sanctions for private use are invalid. Led to the Cannabis for Private Purposes Act No. 7 of 2024.


Other Foreign Authorities

Arriola v Recurso de Hecho (A.891.XLIV) — Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Argentina, 25 August 2009 — Unanimous, 11-0

Criminalising personal use that harms no third party is unconstitutional. Principle: Self-Regarding Conduct.


RE 635.659 — Supremo Tribunal Federal, Brazil, 26 June 2024

Personal possession decriminalised. Racial bias in enforcement is itself a constitutional violation. Principle: Proportionality and Equal Protection.


Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), July 2008

Rastafari sacramental use acquitted. Criminal law yields to established religious practice. Principle: Religious Exemption by Judicial Decision.


Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), December 2019

Home cultivation for personal use is not criminal. Principle: Private Cultivation.


Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418 (2006) — United States Supreme Court

State must show compelling interest and use least restrictive means against sincere religious practice. Principle: Least Restrictive Means.


Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015, Section 7(2)(c)(a) — Jamaica

Statutory sacramental exemption for Rastafari practitioners. Commerce and trafficking remain fully criminal. Principle: Legislative Religious Exemption.


R v Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim 2263 — Court of Appeal, England and Wales

Prohibition upheld but Rastafari religious sincerity formally acknowledged by the court.

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X.  The Five Principles That Win This Argument

PRINCIPLE: 1. Constitutional Supremacy

Section 1(1) and 1(3) CFRN: Any law inconsistent with the Constitution is void. No amendment needed — only honest application.


PRINCIPLE: 2. The External Manifestation Principle

Section 38 protects physical practice and observance, not just internal belief. A law that criminalises a religion's central liturgical act extinguishes the religion. Source: Kwara College v Saliu; Nkpa v Nkume, both Nigerian Court of Appeal.


PRINCIPLE: 3. Self-Regarding Conduct and Bodily Autonomy

A competent adult's private bodily choices, affecting no third party, override state interference. Source: Okonkwo (2001) Nigerian Supreme Court; Prince III (2018) South Africa; Arriola (2009) Argentina, unanimous 11-0.


PRINCIPLE: 4. Proportionality and Reasonable Justification

Section 45 limitations must be proportionate to the public interest served. Fifteen to twenty-five years for private personal consumption causing no third-party harm is not proportionate. Source: Kwara College v Saliu; RE 635.659 Brazil (2024).


PRINCIPLE: 5. Least Restrictive Means

Where the state has a legitimate regulatory interest, it must use the least restrictive means available. A licensing or exemption regime exists. Imprisonment is not the least restrictive means. Source: Gonzales v O Centro Espirita (2006), United States Supreme Court.

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XI.  References and Verifiable Authorities

Nigerian Constitutional Provisions and Legislation

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), Sections 1, 37, 38, 45

National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Act, Cap. N30, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004

Indian Hemp Act 1966 (as amended)

Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 2009


Nigerian Case Law

Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 — Supreme Court of Nigeria

Provost, Kwara State College of Education, Ilorin & Ors v Basirat Saliu & Ors — Court of Appeal Nigeria

Nkpa v Nkume — Court of Appeal Nigeria

Registered Trustees of the Rosicrucian Order, AMORC (Nigeria) v Awoniyi (1994) ALL NLR 479


Foreign Case Law

Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope [2002] ZACC 1; 2002 (2) SA 794 (CC) — Prince II, South Africa

Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v Prince [2018] ZACC 30; 2018 (6) SA 393 (CC) — Prince III, South Africa

Cannabis for Private Purposes Act, No. 7 of 2024 — South Africa

Arriola, Sebastián y otros v Recurso de Hecho (A.891.XLIV) — Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, Argentina, 25 August 2009

RE 635.659 — Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), Brazil, 26 June 2024

Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), July 2008 — Rastafari religious exemption ruling

Corte di Cassazione (Italian Supreme Court of Cassation), December 2019 — Home cultivation for personal use

Gonzales v O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 US 418 (2006) — United States Supreme Court

R v Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim 2263 — Court of Appeal, England and Wales

Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act 2015, Section 7(2)(c)(a) — Jamaica


International Instruments

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), Article 8 — Nigeria is a signatory

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Articles 18 and 27


Academic Sources

Lubaale and Mavundla, 'Decriminalisation of Cannabis for Personal Use in South Africa' (2021) African Human Rights Law Journal — ahrlj.up.ac.za

Nelson, 'Contesting Cannabis Legalization in Nigeria' (2025) 95(1) Sociological Inquiry — onlinelibrary.wiley.com

Nwauche, 'Law, Religion and Human Rights in Nigeria' (2010) African Human Rights Law Journal — ahrlj.up.ac.za

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— End of Article —

Opinion piece. Not legal advice. All cited authorities are real and publicly verifiable.

 
 
 

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